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This essay looks askance at how robot-assisted childcare is constructed in the public domain of the 
internet. Complex interactions of rhetorical manoeuvres, narratives and postnarrativity, and semiotic 
slippages may channel the apperception of this application of robotics. The prospect of robots in 
childcare roles is exceptionally contentious, for it connotes interference with the child-caregiver 
attachment bond. The industry’s response to psychology-informed concerns is to ‘rebrand’ the 
product as a robot companion for a child or as a home robot for the family. A technocentric bias in 
information disseminated online creates an illusion of expertise and may endorse technology-driven 
morality. 
 
1 Introduction 
Human experience increasingly takes place within what Floridi (2010) has termed the infosphere, 
offline as well as online, where the ‘threshold between here (analogue, carbon-based, offline) and there 
(digital, silicon-based, online) is fast becoming blurred’ (p. 8). Socially interactive robots come into being 
within this lifeworld of blurred boundaries, and increasingly differ from the androids of classic science 
fiction and folklore. Bots in various forms and degrees of physical embodiment are already part of everyday 
life. Disembodied automated response systems and internet search engines routinely configure day-to-day 
activities. Chatbots enter our social spaces if we let them in, and ‘smart’ devices (e.g. Amazon Echo) may sit 
on our shelves. We encounter robots also vicariously through a confluence of sources ranging from movies, 
television dramas and documentaries, newspapers, blogs and commercial websites.  
The topic of robot-assisted childcare can encompass devices ranging from smart baby monitors and 
robot companions (already available) to futuristic humanoids providing total care, which may or may not be 
technologically feasible. This essay looks askance at how the topic is constructed in the public domain of the 
internet, where complex interactions of rhetorical manoeuvres, narratives and postnarrativity, and semiotic 
slippages may guide sense-making apropos technological innovations. In the polyphonic onslaught of 
informational flows, the term ‘robot’ acquires meaningfulness beyond the concrete referent. It becomes ‘an 
object formed in discourse in more profound ways than being the subject of talk about machines that 
engineers build. The talked-about robot has semiotic properties that are not reducible to the machine’s 
technical properties’ (Jones 2016, p. 49).  
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The word apperception serves to emphasize that people may make sense of robots designed for 
assisting childcare by assimilating the idea into a body of ideas they already possess, such as beliefs about 
child development, good parenting, and machines. The particular labelling of the artefact (robot nanny, 
babysitter, companion, childcare robot, home robot) is part of its discursive construction. Such labels, 
however, keep the focus on the machine. Rendering the topic as robot-assisted childcare shifts the problem 
space. The problem is not the robot, but the necessity of its application; that is, the question is not whether 
robots capable of childcare tasks can be built, but whether people with childcare responsibilities need robots 
to assist them, and what are the long-term implications of robotic assistance for both child and caregiver. 
Robot-assisted childcare raises a plethora of ethical issues. Opinions are polarized. Faith in potential benefits 
underpins moral claims that place the onus on society to take advantage of technological progress for our 
children’s sake whereas concerns informed by extant knowledge of child development and socialization 
drive moral claims that place the onus on society to safeguard our children against misuses of technology. 
Since the industry is in its infancy, there is no direct evidence for and against either standpoint. 
Consequently, the topic area is a depository of hopes, fears and even fantasies, all of which find expression 
in the ways that information about robots is disseminated and received.  
This essay shifts the problem space again. At issue is not pros and cons of robot-assisted childcare 
per se, but how the affordances of information and communication technologies (ICT) may channel the 
apperception of robot-assisted childcare ahead of any face-to-face interaction with such robots. Up to a 
point, this takes a cue from postphenomenology. Ihde (2008) has noted a recent ‘empirical turn’ in 
philosophy of technology, expressed in research centred on case studies and descriptive concreteness, and 
marked by attention to how technological materiality enters the lifeworld. Nørskov (2015) revisits Ihde’s 
position on technological relationships through the concrete case of people interacting with each other via a 
teleoperated robot. In contradistinction, the present essay concerns how people may vicariously relate to 
(ideas of) socially interactive robots via embodied practices associated with ICT.  
It is widely commented that interface technologies, which enable users to fast-forward and rewind, 
skip, surf channels and the internet, and so forth, bring about the collapse of narrative. Rushkoff (2013) 
proposes that consequently the path to sense-making resembles an open game with no end-goal; and digital 
technology, as a cultural landscape, has begun profoundly to affect people’s conception of themselves in 
relations to others and institutions. Similarly, Turkle (2011) points to society’s arrival at what she calls a 
‘robotic moment’, marked by readiness to accept robots as relationship partners, as a consequence of social 
media, the internet and communication devices. New intimacies with our machines create what she terms 
‘tethered’ lives, lived by subjects wired into social existence through technology. These observations 
intersect with the present issue, firstly, apropos the immediate level of accessing online information about 
robots and children, whereby one enters the culture of presentism and postnarrativity. The main body of the 
essay concerns this level of analysis. Secondly, and more speculatively, the emergence of ‘tethered’ lives 
may lead to normalization of technology-driven morality. 
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2 Contours of the controversy  
2.1 The ‘robot nannies’ debate 
The prospect of robots in childcare roles is exceptionally contentious, for it connotes interference 
with the primary and deepest relationship any human being can have. The attachment bond formed between 
an infant and a human caregiver is believed to set the foundation for individuals’ personality development, 
mental health, intimate relationships and commitments in adulthood (e.g. Bowlby 1969, Ainsworth and 
Bowlby 1991, Schore and Schore 2008). The industry’s response to concerns in this vein is to deflect from 
the controversy by ‘rebranding’ the product as a robot companion for children or as a home robot for the 
family (examples throughout the following).  
In Britain, the topic attracted media attention first in 2008. Under the headline, ‘Robot nannies threat 
to child care,’ the Daily Telegraph reported concerns raised by professor of robotics Noel Sharkey during 
the Cheltenham Science Festival. It could be ‘all too easy to leave the kids with a robot and watch what is 
going on in the corner of your computer screen. … This may be quite safe and entertaining but what kind of 
role model is a robot? Could this lead to a generation of social misfits?’ (Sharkey, quoted in Highfield, 
2008). Sharkey (2008) outlined his ethical appraisal in Science (open access) and has been cited by Wired 
(Keim, 2008), for instance. Subsequently, Interaction Studies dedicated a special issue (volume 11, number 
2) to the debate. In the target article, Sharkey and Sharkey (2010) outlined an argument firmly grounded in 
developmental psychology—citing Bowlby’s attachment theory and more—and implored policymakers to 
put in place statutory interventions to prevent potential misuses of robots by irresponsible parents. Several 
commentators concurred, but others disagreed that the risks are realistic or that such robots are 
technologically feasible in the near future. Although Interaction Studies is not open access, comparing this 
set of academic papers with the aggregate of webpages sampled in the present study throws into sharp relief 
some of the peculiarities of online informational flows.  
The journal’s special issue brought together a multidisciplinary cast of 29 writers with expertise in 
either child development or robotics. The debate had a distinctive multivoiced character not only because the 
participants voiced dissimilar views, but also because even convergent views were informed by different 
disciplinary platforms, and their proponents interacted differently with the topic (Jones 2016). Nevertheless, 
an overall coherence emerged, firstly, due to the fact that a shared focus of attention had been set in the 
target paper. The numerous ‘voices’ were in dialogue with each other (even when not directly addressing 
other writers) by virtue of agreeing or disagreeing with the Sharkeys’ argument. Hence, the set of papers as a 
whole had the coherence of a debate. Secondly, since all the papers shared a focus, it was possible to 
compare their orientations. The analysis revealed thematic differences along three dimensions irreducible to 
each other (utopian versus dystopian leanings, factual versus speculative bases for argumentation, and 
technology-led versus psychology–led expositions), constituting the dimensionality of the debate as a whole 
(Jones 2016). 
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In contrast, webpages downloaded from a heterogenous array of internet sources (this study’s 
dataset) inevitably represent different agendas, reasons and motives to tell about robots for children. These 
diverse ‘voices’ inhabit cyberspace separately from each other—a list of links collated by a search engine. In 
the absence of a shared issue to contend with, no clear dimensionality emerges from the aggregate. 
Consequently, the medium of the internet provides little exposure to a range of alternative viewpoints about 
robots and children. The topic loses its dimensionality and depth of debate. Instead of dialogue across texts, 
there are at most instances of cross-references.  
In autumn 2016, Avatar Mind launched iPal, marketing it primarily in China as a robot companion 
suitable for children aged 3-8 years who might spend daily a few hours alone. According to Avatar Mind’s 
founder Jiping Wang, iPal is ‘perfect for the time when children arrive home from school a few hours before 
their parents get off work’ (quoted, e.g., in Wong 2016a and Baart 2016). British newspapers immediately 
linked it to the earlier controversy. The Guardian reported the launch of iPal under the headline, ‘“This is 
awful”: robot can keep children occupied for hours without supervision’ (Wong, 2016a). The quoted 
statement was Noel Sharkey’s response to the news. The Daily Mail’s headline read, ‘Would you let a robot 
look after YOUR child? Meet iPal, the controversial child sized machine whose inventors claim it can be 
used as a babysitter’ (Liberatore, 2016). At the time, the product’s official website included a page 
describing iPal as ‘a great companion robot for kids. With its cute cartoon outlook, fine craftwork, latest 
natural language understanding technology, and cloud apps, it will be your child’s best friend’ (retrieved on 
26 November 2016). By spring 2017, this page along with a few other pages of the original layout have been 
converted to a fast-moving slide show at the bottom of the English-language website. Its counterpart on the 
Chinese-language site remained prominently separate as late as September 2017 (the Chinese site too has 
changed when revisited in November 2017). The revision of English-language promotion of iPal may 
reflect, in part, an expansion of its range of commercial applications (advertised on the revamped site). 
Nevertheless, the careful selection of which content to retain and which to remove seems consistent with a 
‘damage-limitation’ reaction to criticisms in the Anglophone world. The critics raised concerns about remote 
monitoring of children left home alone. Subsequently, a webpage declaring that ‘when parents are away, 
they can use their phone to remotely control iPalTM, monitor their child’s safety and well-being, and video 
chat with him from anywhere and at any time’ (retrieved on 26 November 2016) has been removed from the 
English site, though its Chinese counterpart was still prominently available in early autumn 2017 (gone by 
November). 
 
2.2 Semiotic slippage and rhetorical redirection 
The juxtaposition ‘robot nanny’ throws us into confrontation with the unknown—a future of human-
robot coexistence—whilst keeping us fixated on the maternal role of a child’s caregiver, traditionally the 
mother or a surrogate female. This semiotic slippage in Sharkey and Sharkey’s (2010) title ‘The Crying 
Shame of Robot Nannies’, following the Telegraph’s 2008 headline (‘Robot nannies threat…’), could be 
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construed as a side-effect of an innocuous attempt to create an audience-grabbing title. Nevertheless, it 
conjures a surrogate humanoid, an android Mary Poppins. Insofar as notions of such an artefact are readily 
dismissible as technologically unrealistic, the semiotic slippage detracts from the realistic likelihood that 
busy parents might become over-reliant on remote monitoring of infants who are effectively left alone for 
long periods. It is not necessary to personify the gadgets as ‘nannies’ or ‘babysitters’ in order to raise these 
concerns; and the artefacts themselves do not need to be humanoid. For instance, Aristotle by Nabi, which 
was advertised in January 2017 as a ‘smart baby monitor’, is a featureless speaker and camera set. Direct 
promotions were no longer available by spring 2017; but according to specifications quoted in a Daily Mail 
article dated earlier, Aristotle could ‘automatically recognize when a baby wakes up, and sooth them to sleep 
with a lullaby, white noise, a favourite song … Log dirty diapers and feedings. Automatically order more 
diapers and/or formula. … Answer questions until your child falls asleep. Play guessing games with kids … 
Read aloud from a selection of thousands of children’s books,’ and more (Liberatore, 2017). Such a device 
might seem to liberate parents from parenting chores, but it also removes the parent from ‘bonding’ 
opportunities created in routines such as bedtime stories, playing games, and answering the child’s 
questions, let alone cuddling the baby whilst singing or storytelling. 
The industry continues to develop robots with ‘childcare’ applications, but the unfavourable 
comments that such robots received in 2008-2010 may have affected marketing strategies at least in the 
Anglophone world. Whereas earlier, NEC (2005) announced the introduction of so-called ‘Childcare Robot 
PaPeRo’, companies introducing similar devices more recently tend to call them ‘robot companions’ or 
‘home robots’, leaving any references to childcare-related functions to the small print. The promise of a 
companion for the child positions the robot as a peer, ‘someone’ with whom the child may bond as with 
another child. This could be cynically construed as a ploy to lull parents into feeling that their child is not 
alone when playing with a robot. Since a peer companion is not meant to replace a parent, this labelling 
effectively deflects from the ‘robot nannies’ controversy without addressing the concerns about robot-
assisted childcare. Nevertheless, a ‘companion’ implies one-to-one relationship. One readily imagines a 
child with a robot instead of another child or an adult. Marketing the device as a ‘home’ robot further 
distances the product from the controversy. For instance, aiming primarily at the American market, Mayfield 
Robotics has promoted Kuri as a versatile home robot that could become a member of the family, like a pet. 
Although some of Kuri’s functions parallel iPal’s (e.g. remote monitoring, reading a book to the child), its 
promotion as something for the home—an appliance on par with a television—avoids suggesting that it is 
meant to assist parenting. 
 
2.3 Presentism and timeliness  
Sampling informational flows on the internet is like a dip in the proverbial river. Just as one cannot 
enter the same river twice, we see a snapshot only of what is online at the moment. At the same time, 
unarchived articles and fragments of past contents that have migrated to other websites remain present as if 
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timeless, qualitatively indistinguishable from new or modified contents even when dates of editing are 
provided.  
Presentism definable as an attitude that uncritically imposes current values and preoccupations 
underpins the construal of this topic’s timeliness or, in rhetorician terminology, its kairos (opportune 
moment). Lately, automation of the workforce has dominated the news. Concerning iPal, the Guardian 
headline in September 2016 (‘This is awful’…) is followed with the exposition, ‘A child-size robot designed 
to take on distinctly adult responsibilities takes the debate over the automation of human jobs to the next 
level’ (Wong 2016a). Reiterating Noel Sharkey’s comments apropos PaPeRo in an earlier report (Wong, 
2016b) and acknowledging that child-robot interaction is ethically more fraught than robots in the 
workforce, Wong (2016a) nonetheless embeds the former in the latter, commenting that ‘Childcare has 
rarely, if ever, been a particularly well-remunerated or respected job, but it is essential’. Put colloquially, if 
you are worried about robots replacing workers in major industries, consider also the consequences in this 
marginalized sector of the workforce, where replacing humans with robots could have dire consequences. 
This drift to another controversy is accentuated by Baart (2016) in a blog article about iPal: ‘The mechanic 
babysitter raises concerns regarding the consequences of using robots to raise our children, simultaneously 
highlighting the debate about the automation of human jobs. … Robot employment to childcare will lead 
to “a number of severe attachment disorders that could reap havoc in our society” (quoting Sharkey, 
originally in Wong 2016b). Arguably, the ‘havoc in society’ that Sharkey foresees is due to psychological 
damage to a generation raised by gadgets, not loss of jobs.  
Whereas the prospect of automation fuels worries about unemployment in the West, in Japan 
robotics promises solutions to workforce shortages. Under the headline, ‘Robotics makes baby steps toward 
solving Japan’s child care shortage,’ a Japan Times English-language article describes RoHo as a robotic 
care system that could be ready for a trial run by summer 2016 and full-scale implementation in 2018 
(Bishop 2016a). There is an artist’s realistic image of a sentinel drone guiding a cart of preschool children 
across a street. The article provides a wealth of information about the project, such as a specified location, 
naming and quoting the team leader. Google searches did not yield any independent corroboration of the 
RoHo project or the existence of its named leader. While the article has the trappings of a well-researched 
report published in a credible newspaper, closer scrutiny of the webpage reveals that it was published on 
April the 1st and that the sidebar tags include April fool’s day. Fake news about robots might be a harmless 
hoax, but nevertheless contribute to informational flows. At a cursory glance it is difficult to distinguish the 
above from a Japan Times article published in September 2017 (Martin 2017), which reports about a project 
testing a specially designed robot at a nursery school, again with an emphasis on alleviating the burden on 
overworked nursery school teachers amidst a nationwide staffing shortage. Less outlandishly than drones 
leading young children across streets, this robotic care system could monitor infants’ heart rate, breathing 
and body temperature during naps in the nursery, and alert staff to any abnormalities. A named advisor to 
the project (Nobuaki Nakazawa) is real. However, unless we happen to be interested in following specific 
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projects and therefore are concerned with their veracity, both the aforementioned articles equally feed into 
appraisals of robot-assisted childcare.  
ICT-mediated presentism blurs boundaries not only between past and present but also between the 
technologically feasible and the imaginatively plausible. Bishop (2016a) may give food for thought even 
when we take it to be a hoax. The article is followed with a link to a survey inviting readers to rate the idea 
of androids looking after children. On 11 April 2016, Japan Times republished the article in its ‘language’ 
section (with the caveat that it was originally published on April’s fool day) under the title, ‘Let’s discuss 
using robots in child care,’ along with a lesson plan (Bishop 2016b).  
3 The technological imagination 
3.1 Fault lines 
The technological imagination, as termed in Jones (2016), paraphrases C. Wright Mills’ definition of 
the sociological imagination. Whereas the sociological imagination is a stance that interprets social 
phenomena in terms of what these reveal about the workings of a society, the technological imagination 
interprets social issues in terms of what technology can do for society and persons. These alternative 
perspectives feature in robotics as two camps at loggerheads about how to steer the technology. As Herik et 
al. (2011) put it, the ‘society-driven side opines that the world is driven and run by social aspects,’ and is 
concerned with ‘safety, security and supervision’; the ‘technology-driven side tells that the world is driven 
and run by technological developments, and that robots are here for further enhancements and new 
applications,’ and measures progress in terms of innovation (p. 107). This fault line runs also through the 
discourse of robots for children. However, while the schism was clear in the ‘robot nannies’ debate in 
Interaction Studies (cf. Jones, 2016), it is diffused in the public domain. The diffusion reflects the mundane 
fact that, online, differing viewpoints are expressed across unconnected contexts, with different agendas or 
reasons for informing about robots for children, and likely with different audiences (as opposed to a 
specialist academic journal providing a platform for the debate). Less trivial is the finding that psychology-
informed appraisals of robot-assisted childcare, and of robots for children in general, are scarce.  
An article posted in a blog associated with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) under the title, ‘Robot nannies: should gadgets raise your kids?’ (Chant, 2017) appraises 
risks ensuing from potential abuses of technology. It includes an interview with the vice president of the 
IEEE Society on Social Implications of Technology, Jim Isaak, who points out that devices such as Kuri and 
Aristotle could be hacked, enabling strangers to watch the child, or might be used to sell products to young 
children. Listing ethical concerns, Isaak identifies scenarios likely to raise issues of legal responsibility; for 
instance, ‘If a robot accidently hurts a child, how will this be handled in court? Conversely, how should the 
robot respond if it witnesses child abuse in the home?’ While these are pertinent issues, conspicuously 
absent in his appraisal are concerns about psychological risks to children raised by gadgets. Cautionary notes 
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such as Isaak’s are society-driven in accordance with Herik et al.’s (2011) characterization, but would be 
classed as technology-led following Jones’ (2016) analysis of the robot-nannies debate.  
In the latter context, irrespective of whether particular writers promoted or contested the idea of 
robot nannies, psychology-led arguments emphasized a basis in knowledge of child psychology, and called 
for evaluating risks and benefits of robot-assisted childcare on that basis. Technology-led arguments 
emphasized understanding the technology, and evaluated its capacity to deliver childcare. In the present 
dataset, technology-driven texts tend to inform about progress, either introducing specific gadgets or 
reviewing the state of the art regarding robots and children (not necessarily ‘childcare’ robots). An article 
published on Forbes website under the headline, ‘Could your child’s best friend be a robot?’ (Yao, 2017) 
describes how much children enjoyed interacting with social robots in an exhibition. The writer, Mariya 
Yao, is the head of R&D in an AI and bots firm; she is clearly passionate about this technology. Her answer 
to the headline question is unconditionally affirmative, and her enthusiasm ‘sells’ us the notion that children 
love robots and therefore should have robot companions: ‘Robots captured the hearts of children long before 
they stirred the imagination of Silicon Valley. … Technology pioneers in robotics, artificial intelligence, and 
character design have turned childhood fantasies into reality’ (p. 1). Yao quotes roboticist Cynthia Breazeal, 
who believes that ‘technology should “prioritize the unique needs of a human being” by having a highly 
interactive and “empathetic presence.”’ (p. 2). In other words, social robots differ from other devices by 
virtue of being equipped with algorithms for face and voice recognition, and for interactional reciprocity 
(‘empathetic’ responses). Biologically inspired design allows the machine to mimic how people naturally 
interact with each other. To say that these machines ‘prioritize’ the ‘unique needs’ of human beings, 
however, is fundamentally different from saying that a mother prioritizes her child’s unique needs.  
 
3.2 Do children need robot friends?  
The above question is posed rhetorically. If it is answered in earnest, either yes or no, one’s answer 
would reflect personal values and beliefs rather than evidence-based reasoning. Children’s fascination with 
robots encountered in an exhibition or other brief encounters should be taken with circumspection. 
Longitudinal studies indicated that users of commercially available robots typically spent less than a 
combined total of 10 hours with the robot before losing interest (Tanaka et al. 2007), and likewise studies 
that placed robots in schools often found that children grew bored with a robot after a few sessions (cf. Jones 
2016). Roboticists usually tackle this ‘glitch’ by adding novel features to the robot so as to rekindle 
children’s interest. The question, do children actually need robots, is sidestepped. 
The technological imagination hears the query, could a robot be your child’s best friend, as an 
inquiry about the machine’s capacity to do what it is designed to do. For instance, an ipalrobot.com page 
that in autumn 2016 featured prominently on the English-language website bore the title, ‘A Friend to Play 
With’ followed with the information that ‘iPal has 25 motors that enable it to make intricate human-like 
movements. It has a 3 watt per channel sound system for high quality music. Your child will enjoy its 
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dancing and music, and its ability to play fun games’ (retrieved on 26 November 2016; it has since been 
incorporated into the home page slide show). The depiction of a robot as a friend can be stretched too far for 
Western sensibilities, however. Originally, Avatar Mind claimed that iPal ‘is not a cold, unfeeling machine, 
but … is happy when your child is happy, and encourages your child when he is sad’ (retrieved on 23 
October 2016). Shy of a year later, the only trace of this statement can be found in independent articles, 
dated to autumn 2016, that have quoted it. Avatar Mind leaves us with the assurance that iPal has been 
developed by robot experts ‘with deep experience in artificial intelligence, motion control, sensors and 
power management technologies’ (retrieved 19 September 2017). Sceptics may note the absence of experts 
in child psychology who may advise about the desirability of having a machine for a friend. 
 
3.3 Illusion of expertise 
The present dataset is skewed towards the technology-driven. Quantitatively, this may simply reflect 
a confluence of circumstantial factors, such as commercial promotion of new products, and the likelihood 
that technology enthusiasts readily blog about gadgets whereas child psychologists and psychotherapists are 
less likely to engage with the topic since the robots in question are not commonplace yet. As a result, 
however, the informational flow takes on the appearance of trending. McKenna and Bargh (2000) pointed to 
a fallacy peculiar to the internet, which they termed the illusion of large numbers, whereby people might 
grossly overestimate how many others share their views, and consequently not realize that their beliefs differ 
from the mainstream. Similarly, an illusion of expertise may apply with respect to the present topic, whereby 
a technocentric construal of robots for children is mistaken not only for a majority view, but also for expert 
opinion.  
Categorical statements made by roboticists insinuate a basis in expertise that allows them to predict 
social-developmental outcomes with the same confidence that Avatar Mind can aver that iPal is equipped 
with cutting-edge technology. Psychologists who are professionally qualified to advise on child socialization 
and mental health are seldom consulted in technology-driven expositions. The level of detail and factual 
grounding in product specifications or reports of specific research projects may also feed the illusion of 
expertise. In contrast, given the current absence of directly relevant empirical evidence, misgivings about 
robot-assisted childcare are by necessity expressed in the generalized manner of a plea to common-sense, 
which at best can be grounded in psychological theories articulated many decades ago in a predigital world. 
When occasionally technology news and blogs tell about psychologists’ investigations into child-robot 
interactions, the emphasis is on ‘testing’ the benefits of using robots in education or (e.g.) with autistic 
children, thus creating the impression that psychologists across the board endorse robots for children.  
An article published in a blog associated with NBC News under the heading, ‘Let robots teach our 
kids? Here’s why that isn’t such a bad idea’ (Bennington-Castro, 2017) promotes robots for preschool 
children. Bennington-Castro identifies a roboticist (Henny Admoni) at Carnegie Mellon University and 
notes unnamed ‘other experts’ who reportedly ‘see these machines playing a significant role in children's 
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emotional, social, and cognitive development in the near future’. Bennington-Castro quotes also a Cornell 
University psychologist (Solace Shen) who investigates child-robot interactions in preschool settings: ‘“The 
goal is not to have the robot replace interactions with humans,” she says, “But more to supplement them.’” 
The setting in which Shen observes child-robot interaction is significant, however. In school, children 
interact with a robot alongside peers and with a teacher present. At home, a busy parent might be tempted to 
leave a child alone with the robot.  
Most articles about robots for children (e.g. the aforementioned by Yao and by Bennington-Castro) 
do not refer to childcare since the focus is on what the robot can do for the child in terms of fun and 
learning. It is a tangential debate whether robots in schools can enhance learning beyond mere edutainment. 
Nevertheless, positive appraisals of robots as educational aids, coupled with the illusion of expertise, may 
persuade parents to invest in a robot for their young child.  
 
3.4 Technology-driven morality 
The technological imagination is associated with the belief that technology is inherently benign and 
beneficial. The tacit narrative could be titled, Good Tech, Bad Human. Robots are good for children, and any 
risks lie in human factors such as neglectful parents, paedophile hackers, and unscrupulous vendors (the 
narrative goes). The moral message is that responsible parents ought to get a robot for their child. This moral 
is explicit in a Wired article bearing the headline ‘Let your children play with robots’ (Carmody, 2010) and 
reporting an interview with Javier Movellan, a principal investigator in a longitudinal project that placed 
robots in the creche of an American university (Tanaka et al. 2007, cf. critique in Jones 2016, 2017). Asked 
by the interviewer, ‘Why should parents let their children play with robots?’ Movellan replied, ‘That’s easy. 
Parents will let their children play with robots when they see that these robots help their children become 
better people: stronger, smarter, happier, more sociable and more affective.’ (Carmody 2010).  
A leap of faith is involved in making those assertions. Movellan’s aforementioned project tested 
robot design, and did not collect data about learning and socialization outcomes. To date, shy of a decade 
later, there is no scientific evidence in support of the claims he made in Wired. By the same token, there is 
no evidence to the contrary. We cannot tell whether generations growing up from infancy with artificial 
agents who can respond, learn and remember, will be better persons, better-off for it, or become lesser as 
humans, even an endangered species. At present, the belief that robots will help children to become ‘better 
people: stronger, smarter, happier, more sociable and more affective’ implies that children whose parents 
cannot afford robots will grow up worse people: weaker, duller, sadder, less sociable and less affective. It 
insinuates that it behoves on governments to ensure that every home and school has robots for kids. This, in 
turn, puts the onus on policymakers to allocate resources to social robotics. The utopian dream is thus 
entangled with political agendas and commercial interests. 
11 
 
4 Conclusion 
At present, most people encounter socially interactive robots mainly through information about them, 
hence interact with objects constructed in narratives about these robots. Interface technologies are said to 
engender the collapse of narrative, and yet a ‘grand narrative’—according to which technological progress 
leads to a better world—seems to establish itself in the public domain of the internet. It is countered with 
prevailing dystopian narratives, most noticeably regarding robots in the workplace. Regarding this essay’s 
focal topic, dystopian undertones recede to the background of comments threads and ‘asides’ in journalistic 
coverage. The industry alludes to a robotic utopia and makes its promises with mythic faith in the power of 
technological progress.  
This mythotopia unfolds against the backdrop of an imaginal landscape owed to science fiction and 
popular culture as much as to technological advances. In this landscape, ‘robot nannies’ still command 
critical attention through semiotic slippage, although substituting human caregivers with robots might 
remain confined to fiction. At present, some critics hold in mind a concept of the good-enough mother—the 
mother who ‘in her ordinary loving care of her own baby’ lays the foundations of the child’s mental health 
(Winnicott 1964, p. 44)—and contest the industry’s implicit construction of parental love, care and guidance 
as commodities that can be deployed by a good-enough machine. The devices poised to enter children’s 
rooms, however, are designed to augment parents’ interactions with their children, directly through video 
chat apps and indirectly in unilateral surveillance. Today’s digital natives are already growing up wired to 
social existence through technology. The apperception of robot-assisted childcare might well change as they 
become tomorrow’s parents.  
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